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Abstract
Constructive theories usually have interesting metamathematical prop-
erties where explicit witnesses can be extracted from proofs of existential
sentences. For relational theories, probably the most natural of these is
the existence property, EP, sometimes referred to as the set existence prop-
erty. This states that whenever (∃x)φ(x) is provable, there is a formula
χ(x) such that (∃!x) φ(x) ∧ χ(x) is provable. It has been known since
the 80’s that EP holds for some intuitionistic set theories and yet fails for
IZF. Despite this, it has remained open until now whether EP holds for
the most well known constructive set theory, CZF. In this paper we show
that EP fails for CZF.
1 Introduction
1.1 Existence Properties
Constructive theories are known for having metamathematical properties that
are often not shared by stronger classical theories such as ZFC. The principles
below are amongst the most well known of these properties.
Constructive mathematicians choose to interpret disjunctions and existential
quantifiers more strictly than classical mathematicians. For the constructive
mathematician, in order to know the disjunction φ ∨ ψ, one must either know
φ or know ψ. They therefore often expect their formal theories to have the
following property:
Definition 1.1. A theory, T has the disjunction property (DP) if whenever
T ⊢ φ ∨ ψ, either T ⊢ φ or T ⊢ ψ.
In order to know (∃x)φ(x), the constructive mathematician must be able to
“construct” some witness a such that one knows φ(a). We certainly know what
it means to construct an element of ω: we must be able to write down an actual
natural number. We also know what it means to construct a function N → N:
we must be able to able to find (a number encoding) an algorithm whose graph
is that function. Hence the constructive mathematician expects their formal
theories to have the following properties. In the definitions below we assume
that T has a constant ω such that T proves that ω is the natural numbers and
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for each n a constant n such that T proves 0 is empty and n+ 1 is the successor
of n. (For any theory that could “reasonably” be called a set theory, there will
be at least a conservative extension with these constants).
Definition 1.2. T has the numerical existence property (NEP) if whenever
T ⊢ (∃x ∈ ω)φ(x) where φ(x) only has x free, there is some natural n such that
T ⊢ φ(n)
Definition 1.3. T is closed under Church’s Rule (CR) if whenever T ⊢ (∀x ∈
ω)(∃y ∈ ω)φ(x, y), where φ only has free variables x and y, there is some natural
e such that
T ⊢ (∀x ∈ ω)φ(x, {e}(x))
(where {e}(x) denotes the result of applying the eth recursive function to x)
What it means to construct mathematical objects in general is less clear,
but a common interpretation of this is that they should at least be definable, in
the sense below.
Definition 1.4. T has the existence property (EP) if whenever T ⊢ (∃x)φ(x),
where φ only has free variable x, there is some formula χ(x) that only has free
variable x such that
T ⊢ (∃!x) φ(x) ∧ χ(x)
1.2 IZF, CST, and CZF
If one wants a theory with some of the metamathematical properties appearing
in section 1.1 but has no other objections to classical mathematics, one may be
satisfied with the theory IZF, which can be regarded as “ZF without excluded
middle.”
Definition 1.5. IZF is the theory with (intuitionistic logic and) the following
axioms:
1. Extensionality
2. Separation
3. Pairing
4. Union
5. Infinity
6. Power Set
7. ∈-induction
8. Collection
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Collection is the following schema (where φ may have other free variables in
addition to x and y):
(∀x ∈ a)(∃y)φ(x, y) → (∃z)(∀x ∈ a)(∃y ∈ z)φ(x, y)
Compare this with the schema (equivalent in ZF) Replacement:
(∀x ∈ a)(∃!y)φ(x, y) → (∃z)(∀x ∈ a)(∃y ∈ z)φ(x, y)
Definition 1.6. IZFR is the set theory with the axioms of IZF except that it
has Replacement instead of Collection.
For technical reasons, in this paper we will in fact consider a variation
of the more usual definitions above that have bounded quantifiers as primi-
tives. That is, for every formula, φ(x, z1, . . . , zn), with free variables amongst
x, z1, . . . , zn there are n + 1-ary predicates (∀x ∈ y)φ(x, z1, . . . , zn) and (∃x ∈
y)φ(x, z1, . . . , zn) together with appropriate axioms for bounded universal and
bounded existential quantification. Note that this is a conservative extension of
the usual definitions above, and therefore the properties mentioned in section
1.1 hold in these versions if and only if they hold in the usual versions.
IZF is extremely powerful. In fact Friedman showed in [6] that it has the
same consistency strength as ZF. On the other hand, IZF has most of the
existence properties we saw earlier.
Often one may be doing mathematics constructively for philosophical rea-
sons. One may be an intuitionist: one believes mathematical objects only ex-
ist if they can be “mentally constructed.” One may be a predicativist: one
believes that a mathematical object cannot be constructed until it is defined
predicatively - that is without quantifiers whose range includes the object being
constructed. In this case one needs to ensure that the axioms of the set theory
are constructively justified. There are (at least) two ways to go about this:
1. Directly justify each axiom as “true” with philosophical reasoning
2. Find another theory that already has a strong constructive foundation and
interpret your set theory into it
Myhill in [19] took the first approach, introducing the following theories.
Both of these are over a three sorted language with sorts for numbers, sets, and
partial functions.
Definition 1.7. CST− is the theory with (intuitionistic logic and) the following
axioms:
1. Extensionality (for sets)
2. Bounded Separation (that is, separation for formulae where every quanti-
fier is bounded)
3. Pairing
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4. Union
5. Exponentiation (that is, given any sets A and B there is a set containing
precisely the functions f : A→ B)
6. Replacement
7. Axioms of Heyting Arithmetic for the number sort
Definition 1.8. CST is the theory CST− together with relativised dependent
choices RDC.
In particular Myhill rejected the power set axiom in favour of the weaker
exponentiation axiom because of the more predicative nature of exponentiation.
He chose bounded separation over full separation for the same reason.
CZF arose via the second approach in [1] where Aczel showed that set
theory can be interpreted into the predicative Martin-Lo¨f type theory. Aczel
also dropped the three sorted approach of CST, instead working over the same
language as ZF.
Definition 1.9. CZF is the theory with (intuitionistic logic and) the following
axioms
1. Extensionality
2. Bounded Separation
3. Pairing
4. Union
5. Strong Infinity
6. Subset Collection: the schema
(∃c)(∀u)((∀x ∈ a)(∃y ∈ b)ψ(x, y, u) →
(∃d ∈ c)((∀x ∈ a)(∃y ∈ d)ψ(x, y, u) ∧ (∀y ∈ d)(∃x ∈ a)ψ(x, y, u)))
7. ∈-induction
8. Strong Collection: the schema
(∀x ∈ a)(∃y)φ(x, y) →
(∃b)((∀x ∈ a)(∃y ∈ b)φ(x, y) ∧ (∀y ∈ b)(∃x ∈ a)φ(x, y))
As with IZF, in this paper we will in fact work with the conservative exten-
sion of CZF that also has predicates and axioms for bounded quantification.
Subset collection implies exponentiation and is implied by power set (see
[2]) and can be seen as an “artifact” of the interpretation of set theory into
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type theory. As an alternative to subset collection, one may instead assume the
equivalent fullness axiom. Given sets A and B, define mv(A,B) to be the class
of multivalued functions as
mv(A,B) := {R ⊆ A×B | (∀a ∈ A)(∃b ∈ B) (a, b) ∈ R}
The fullness axiom can then be stated as follows
(∀A,B)(∃C ⊆ mv(A,B))(∀R) R ∈ mv(A,B) → (∃S ∈ C) (S ⊆ R)
(For a more detailed discussion of the fullness axiom see [2].)
One can see that the fullness axiom asserts the existence of sets for which
there is no apparent definition. We will prove that for the case A = NN, B = N,
there is no definable C.
CZF is stronger thanCST− in two respects: replacement has been strength-
ened to strong collection and exponentiation has been strengthened to subset
collection.
CZF is regarded today as the standard set theory for formalising construc-
tive mathematics. This is because it is constructively valid because of its in-
terpretation into type theory and yet can be used to prove mathematically
interesting results that do not hold in weaker theories. For example, in [15]
Lubarsky and Rathjen showed that the theory CZFE that has only exponenti-
ation in place of subset collection does not prove that the Dedekind reals form
a set, whereas CZF does prove that the Dedekind reals form a set.
1.3 Existence Properties of these Set Theories
The properties DP, NEP, and CR work extremely well as characterisations of
constructive formal theories. None can hold for consistent recursively axioma-
tisable theories that have excluded middle, but on the other hand they hold for
a rich variety of constructive theories.
In [18] Friedman and Myhill showed that IZFR (that is, IZF with replace-
ment instead of collection), has the existence property. In [19], Myhill showed
the set theory CST− also has EP and also that both CST− and CST have
DP and NEP, leaving open whether CST has EP. In [8] Friedman and S˘c˘edrov
showed that IZFR + RDC has EP, establishing that even set theories with
choice principles can have EP.
Beeson then developed q-realizability, allowing him to show in [3] that NEP,
DP, and CR hold for IZF and IZF+RDC. Rathjen developed realizability with
truth based partly on Beeson’s methods to show in [20] and [23] that DP, NEP,
CR and other properties hold for a wide variety of intuitionistic set theories
including CZF, CZF+REA, IZF, IZF+REA with any combination of the
axioms MP, ACω, DC, RDC and PAx.
One can see that EP does not work so well as a characterisation of con-
structive theories as the other properties we have seen. As remarked in [20] EP
can hold for classical theories, even extensions of ZFC. On the other hand,
Friedman and S˘c˘edrov showed in [9] that IZF does not have EP.
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Friedman and S˘c˘edrov’s proof that EP fails for IZF makes use of full sep-
aration and collection. Since IZFR does have EP, it might seem reasonable to
think that collection is responsible for the failure of EP and the use of full sep-
aration is only incidental. However due to recent work by Rathjen, this turns
out not to be the case. Set theories with collection but only bounded separation
can have EP.
In [24] Rathjen defined the following two variations on EP,
Definition 1.10. 1. T has the weak existence property, wEP, if whenever
φ(x) is a formula with x the only free variable and
T ⊢ (∃x)φ(x)
there is some formula χ(x) having at most the free variable x such that
T ⊢ (∃!x)χ(x)
T ⊢ (∀x) (χ(x) → (∃u)u ∈ x)
T ⊢ (∀x) (χ(x) → (∀u ∈ x)φ(u))
2. T has the uniform weak existence property, uwEP, if whenever φ(u, x) is
a formula having at most x and u as free variables and
T ⊢ (∀u)(∃x)φ(u, x)
there is some formula χ(u, x) having at most the free variables u, x such
that
T ⊢ (∀u)(∃!x)χ(u, x)
T ⊢ (∀u)(∀x) (χ(u, x) → (∃z) z ∈ x)
T ⊢ (∀u)(∀x) (χ(u, x) → (∀z ∈ x)φ(u, z))
As remarked in [24], by analysing Friedman and S˘c˘edrov’s proof in [9] one
can see that IZF doesn’t even have wEP. On the other hand any extension of
ZF has uwEP - consider Vα where α is the least ordinal such that Vα contains
a witness.
In [24], Rathjen refers to the theories CZF−, CZFE and CZFP . CZF
−
is CZF without subset collection. CZFE is CZF
− with the exponentiation
axiom. CZFP is CZF together with the power set axiom. All three of these
theories have strong collection, and yet Rathjen shows in [24] that all three have
uwEP (and hence wEP). In that paper he refers to a paper in preparation where
he will show by using this result together with ordinal analysis that these three
theories in fact have EP.
CZFP , which has EP, is simply IZF with bounded separation in place of full
separation, so the use of full separation in Friedman and S˘c˘edrov’s proof must
6
be essential. Furthermore, CZF lies between CZFE and CZFP , two theories
both satisfying EP and uwEP.
However, due to problems defining witnesses for the fullness axiom, these
proofs do not apply to CZF itself. Rathjen goes so far as to conjecture in [24]
that CZF does not even have wEP. In this paper we prove that this conjecture
is correct. CZF does not have wEP, and the fullness axiom is responsible.
1.4 Pcas
When defining realizability, one usually starts with a partial combinatory alge-
bra (pca).
Definition 1.11. A pca, A is a set |A| together with a partial binary operation,
· : |A| × |A|⇁ |A| referred to as application, and distinguished elements, s and
k satisfying the axioms below. Below, and throughout the paper we will write
·(a, b) as (a.b), or simply ab, and follow the convention that application is left
associative. That is, a1a2 . . . an means (. . . ((a1.a2).a3) . . .).an).
1. s 6= k
2. for all a, b ∈ A, kab ≃ a
3. for all a, b ∈ A, sa ↓, sab ↓
4. for all a, b, c ∈ A, sabc ≃ ac(bc)
Recall the following from, for example [27] or [3].
Definition 1.12. Given a pca, A, we define terms over A inductively as follows
1. There is a countable supply of free variables, xi, each of which is a term.
2. Each element, a of A is a term.
3. If s and t are terms, then the ordered pair, 〈s, t〉 is also a term. We write
this as (s.t).
We say that a term is closed if it contains no free variables.
As before, we will usually write the term (s.t) just as st and follow the
convention of left associativity.
Definition 1.13. We define inductively what it means for a closed term, s, to
denote a ∈ A
1. If a′ ∈ A, then a′ denotes a if and only if a = a′
2. (s′.s′′) denotes a if and only if there are a′, a′′ ∈ A such that s′ denotes
a′, s′′ denotes a′′, and a′.a′′ ≃ a.
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If t is a closed term and there is an a ∈ A such that t denotes a, we write
t ↓.
If t(x1, . . . , xn) is an open term with free variables amongst x1, . . . , xn, we
write t ↓ to mean that for every a1, . . . , an ∈ A, t(a1, . . . , an) ↓. If t(x1, . . . , xn)
and t′(x1, . . . , xn) are open terms with free variables amongst x1, . . . , xn, we
write t(x1, . . . , xn) ≃ t
′(x1, . . . , xn) to mean that for all a1, . . . , an ∈ A, t(a1, . . . , an) ≃
t′(a1, . . . , an). That is, t(a1, . . . , an) denotes if and only if t
′(a1, . . . , an) denotes,
and if they denote then they denote the same element of A.
Proposition 1.14. For any term, t(x1, . . . , xn), over A (that may contain
x1, . . . , xn as free variables and possibly more free variables in addition to these)
there is a term t∗ that does not contain the free variables x1, . . . , xn and such
that for all a1, . . . , an ∈ A, t
∗a1 . . . an−1 ↓ and
t∗a1 . . . an ≃ t(a1, . . . , an)
We will write t∗ as λ(x1, . . . , xn).t(x1, . . . , xn).
Proposition 1.15. For any A there are y, y′ ∈ A such that for all f ∈ A,
1. yf ≃ f(yf)
2. y′f ↓ and for all e ∈ A, (y′f)e ≃ f(y′f)e
One can use this to construct pairing and projection operators that we will
refer to as p, p0 and p1. We will write (e)i to mean pie for i = 0, 1. One
can further define numerals that we will denote n for each n ∈ ω. All recursive
functions can then be represented. See chapter 6 of [3] or chapter 1 of [27] for
details.
1.5 The Model V (A)
Realizability is one of the main tools in the study of intuitionistic theories and
was used for many well known results including those mentioned in section 1.3.
The variants of realizability used here have their roots in [13], where Kriesel
and Trolestra adapted Kleene’s realizability from [12] to work with second order
arithmetic. This was later adapted and used by Friedman in [7], by Myhill in
[18] and [19] and by Beeson in [4] and [3]. In [16] and [17], McCarty adapted
Beeson’s definition to work for set theories with extensionality. The definition
below is the variation introduced by Rathjen in [22], where bounded quantifiers
are kept separate in the definition.
Note that while realizability models intuitionistic logic, it takes place in a
“background universe” that may include classical logic. In [16], McCarty carries
out the realizability construction within ZF, although he remarks that in fact
IZF is sufficient. In this paper, we work within a background universe of ZFC.
Following [22], we start by defining the class V (A) using inductive defini-
tions. Recall (for example from [2], section 5) that an inductive definition is a
class, Φ, of ordered pairs and we write X
a
Φ to mean 〈X, a〉 ∈ Φ. Then we have
the following theorem.
8
Theorem 1.16. For any inductive definition, Φ, there is a class I(Φ) which is
the smallest class, Y , such that whenever X ⊆ Y and X
a
Φ we have a ∈ Y .
Proof. This is theorem 5.1 in [2].
We define V (A) using the inductive definition
X
a
Φ iff a ⊆ |A| ×X
That is, explicitly V (A) is the smallest class Y such that
P(|A| × Y ) ⊆ Y
We then introduce a relation  between A and formulae with parameters
over V (A). The first two lines of the definition are defined simultaneously by
∈-induction and the remaining lines allow one to inductively define realizability
for any sentence, φ.
e  a ∈ b iff there is 〈(e)0, c〉 ∈ b such that (e)1  a = c
e  a = b iff for every 〈f, c〉 ∈ a, (e)0f  c ∈ b and
for every 〈f, c〉 ∈ b, (e)1f  c ∈ a
e  φ ∧ ψ iff (e)0  φ and (e)1  ψ
e  φ ∨ ψ iff either (e)0 = 0 and (e)1  φ, or (e)0 = 1 and (e)1  ψ
e  φ→ ψ iff f  φ implies ef  ψ
e  (∃x ∈ a)φ(x) iff there is 〈(e)0, b〉 ∈ a such that (e)1  φ(b)
e  (∀x ∈ a)φ(x) iff for every 〈f, b〉 ∈ a, ef  φ(b)
e  (∃x)φ(x) iff there is a ∈ V (A) such that e  φ(a)
e  (∀x)φ(x) iff for every a ∈ V (A), e  φ(a)
e  ¬φ iff f  φ is false for every f ∈ A
If φ has free variables amongst x1, . . . , xn, we write e  φ to mean e 
(∀x1, . . . , xn)φ (the universal closure of φ).
We write V (A) |= φ to mean that there is e ∈ A such that e  φ.
This structure has been defined so that we get soundness for IZF in the
following sense.
Theorem 1.17. Suppose that φ is a theorem of IZF. Then, V (A) |= φ.
Recall from chapter 5 of [16] that V (A) has certain standard representations
of the naturals and Baire space.
Define
n = {〈m,m〉 | m < n}
ω = {〈n, n〉 | n ∈ ω}
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Then V (A) has a realizer for the statement that ω is the set of natural numbers.
We will also write ω as N.
Suppose that f ∈ A satisfies that for all n ∈ ω, there exists m ∈ ω such that
fn = m. Then write
f = {〈n, (n,m)〉 | n,m ∈ ω, fn = m}
(where we write (, ) for V (A)’s internal notion of ordered pair).
There is a realizer in V (A) for the statement that the set of functions from
ω to ω is precisely
N
N := {〈f, f〉 | (∀n ∈ ω)(∃m ∈ ω) fn = m}
2 Outline of the Proof
We will show that wEP fails for CZF. We do this by first showing that for
any pca, A, we can construct three realizability models, V (A), V f0 (A), and
V Γ0 (A). V (A) is the usual realizability model of IZF from section 1.5. V
f
0 (A)
and V Γ0 (A) are based on functional sets and symmetric sets respectively and
will be described in detail below.
The heart of the proof is that V f0 (A) and V
Γ
0 (A) are essentially different
models and yet both can be embedded into V (A) in such a way that realizability
is preserved by the embedding. V f0 (A) and V
Γ
0 (A) must both provide witnesses
of existential statements that are still valid in V (A). Definability will imply
that these witnesses are realizably equal in V (A).
The final step of the proof is to construct a particular pca, T , based on term
models and normal filter Γ to show wEP fails. The cause of this failure will be
a simple instance of the fullness axiom.
3 The Model V Γ0 (A)
3.1 Definitions
A standard technique for showing the independence of choice principles in clas-
sical set theories is by using symmetric models. These can be seen as boolean
valued models where every element is “symmetric.” See, for example [5], [11],
[10], or [14] for a detailed description. We will construct a realizability model,
V Γ0 (A) based on the same ideas.
We start by defining the model V1(A). As for V (A), we define this using
inductive definitions. V (A) is the smallest class X satisfying
P(2× |A| ×X) ⊆ X
One can think of V1(A) as things from V (A) with an extra label from 2.
Hence given any element of V1(A) we can think of it as an element of V (A) by
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ignoring this extra label. Explicitly, we define this recursively as follows. Given
a ∈ V1(A),
a◦ := {〈e, b◦〉 | 〈s, e, b〉 ∈ a}
We write e 1 φ to mean that e  φ in V (A) when each parameter, a, in φ
has been replaced by a◦.
Definition 3.1. Let A be a pca. We say that α is an automorphism of A if it
is a bijection A → A that such that both α and α−1 preserve application and
fix s and k.
Given an automorphism, α, of A, we can lift this inductively to V1(A) as
follows:
α(a) = {〈0, α(e), α(b)〉 | 〈0, e, b〉 ∈ a} ∪ {〈1, α(e), α(b)〉 | 〈1, e, b〉 ∈ a}
So this is simply the natural action of the automorphism group on V1(A).
We assume that the pairing and projection elements and numerals that ap-
pear in the definition of realizability over V (A) are defined using s and k and
therefore fixed by any automorphism. Hence we get
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that α is an automorphism of A and
e  φ
Then if φα is the result of replacing any parameters c in φ by α(c), we have
α(e)  φα
Recall that normal filters are defined as follows.
Definition 3.3. Let G be a group. Then a set of subgroups, Γ, is a normal
filter on G if
1. G ∈ Γ
2. H ∈ Γ and H is a subgroup of H ′ implies that H ′ ∈ Γ
3. H,H ′ ∈ Γ implies that H ∩H ′ ∈ Γ
4. H ∈ Γ and g ∈ G implies gHg−1 ∈ Γ
Recall that stabilisers are defined as follows.
Definition 3.4. If G is a group of automorphisms of A and a ∈ V1(A), we
define the stabiliser of a in G as
StabG(a) := {α ∈ G | α(a) = a}
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Definition 3.5. Given a group G of automorphisms of A and Γ, a normal filter
on G, we define the class V Γ0 (A) ⊆ V1(A), of partly symmetric sets inductively
as follows.
V Γ0 (A) is the smallest class X such that
{a ∈ V1(A) | StabG(a) ∈ Γ and (∀〈0, e, b〉 ∈ a) b ∈ X} ⊆ X
In other words, a ∈ V1(A) is partly symmetric if it has a “large” stabiliser
and every element that has been labelled with a 0 is also partly symmetric. Note
that this property is preserved by automorphisms, and one can easily show the
following.
Proposition 3.6. If a ∈ V1(A) and α is an automorphism of A such that
α(a) = a, then α(a◦) = a◦.
In particular if we take an element of V Γ0 (A), then it still has StabG(a) ∈ Γ
when we consider it as an element of V (A).
We can now define realizability on V Γ0 (A) as follows
e 0 a ∈ b iff there is 〈0, (e)0, c〉 ∈ b such that (e)1 0 a = c
e 0 a = b iff for every 〈0, f, c〉 ∈ a, (e)0f 0 c ∈ b and
for every 〈0, f, c〉 ∈ b, (e)1f 0 c ∈ a, and e 1 a = b
e 0 φ ∧ ψ iff (e)0 0 φ and (e)1 0 ψ
e 0 φ ∨ ψ iff either (e)0 = 0 and (e)1 0 φ, or (e)0 = 1 and (e)1 0 ψ
e 0 φ→ ψ iff f 0 φ implies ef 0 ψ, and e 1 φ→ ψ
e 0 (∃x ∈ a)φ(x) iff there is 〈0, (e)0, b〉 ∈ a such that (e)1 0 φ(b)
e 0 (∀x ∈ a)φ(x) iff for every 〈0, f, b〉 ∈ a, ef 0 φ(b), and e 1 (∀x ∈ a)φ(x)
e 0 (∃x)φ(x) iff there is a ∈ V
Γ
0 (A) such that e 0 φ(a)
e 0 (∀x)φ(x) iff for every a ∈ V
Γ
0 (A), e 0 φ(a), and e 1 (∀x)φ(x)
e 0 ¬φ iff f 1 φ is false for every f ∈ A
We write V Γ0 (A) |= φ to mean that there is some e ∈ A such that e 0 φ.
We clearly have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.7. Suppose that α is an automorphism and
e 0 φ
Then, writing φα for the formula obtained by replacing any parameters, a, in φ
by α(a),
α(e) 0 φ
α
The definition above can be seen as a combination of realizability and Kripke
models of intuitionistic logic. See for example [26] for a description of Kripke
models. Like in [9], the poset used in this model would have just two elements.
On this basis, one should not be surprised by the following proposition.
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Proposition 3.8. Suppose that e 0 φ. Then also e 1 φ.
Proof. We show this by induction on formulae, φ. One can see that the def-
inition of 0 has been carefully chosen so that we can perform the induction
at =, universal quantifiers, implication, and negation. One can check that the
induction holds at conjunction, disjunction, ∈, and existential quantifiers.
3.2 Soundness Theorems
We now need to show soundness for intuitionistic logic and the axioms of CZF.
Throughout the soundness theorems, the following proposition is useful.
Proposition 3.9. 1. To show e 0 (∀x1) . . . (∀xn)φ(x1, . . . , xn) it is suffi-
cient to show that for all a1, . . . , an ∈ V
Γ
0 (A),
e 0 φ(a1, . . . , an)
and for all a1, . . . , an ∈ V1(A),
e 1 φ(a1, . . . , an)
2. To show e 0 φ1 → (φ2 → (. . . → (φn → ψ) . . .), it is sufficient to show
that for any e1, . . . , en−1 ∈ A, ee1 . . . en−1 ↓ and that whenever ei 0 φi
for each i = 1, . . . , n we have
ee1 . . . en 0 ψ
and whenever ei 1 φi for each i = 1, . . . , n we have
ee1 . . . en 1 ψ
Proof. Both parts can be proved by induction on n.
3.3 First Order Logic
Proposition 3.10. V Γ0 (A) satisfies soundness for first order logic.
Explicitly this means that for every axiom φ of the intuitionistic predicate
calculus, V Γ0 (A) |= φ, and for every inference rule,
φ1,...,φn
ψ
, if V Γ0 (A) |= φi for
i = 1, . . . , n, then V Γ0 (A) |= ψ.
The reader may wish to compare the following with the proofs for soundness
of intuitionistic logic in realizability and Kripke models in, for example, [26].
3.3.1 Axioms
The axioms of intuitionistic predicate calculus are as follows.
1. φ→ (ψ → φ)
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2. (φ→ (ψ → χ))→ ((φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ χ))
3. φ→ (ψ → φ ∧ ψ)
4. φ ∧ ψ → φ
5. φ ∧ ψ → ψ
6. φ→ φ ∨ ψ
7. ψ → φ ∨ ψ
8. (φ ∨ ψ)→ ((φ→ χ)→ ((ψ → χ)→ χ))
9. (φ→ ψ)→ ((φ→ ¬ψ)→ ¬φ)
10. φ→ (¬φ→ ψ)
11. (∀x)φ(x) → φ(y), where y is free for x in φ(x)
12. φ(y)→ (∃x)φ(x), where y is free for x in φ(x)
As an example we will prove 2 and 11. These demonstrate the main ideas
that are used for the remaining axioms.
2 We claim that
s 0 (φ→ (ψ → χ))→ ((φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ χ))
By proposition 3.9, it is enough to show that whenever e 0 φ → (ψ → χ)
f 0 φ→ ψ and g 0 φ we have
sefg 0 χ
and whenever e 1 φ→ (ψ → χ) f 1 φ→ ψ and g 1 φ we have
sefg 1 χ
However, sefg = eg(fg), so one can easily check that this is the case. (We also
have that by definition sef ↓ for all e and f .)
11 Let I := skk be the identity. Then we claim
I 0 (∀x)φ(x) → φ(y)
What we actually mean is the universal closure of this axiom. Without loss
of generality we can assume the universal closure is (ignoring any additional
parameters) the following:
I 0 (∀y)((∀x)φ(x) → φ(y))
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Expanding this out, this means that for b ∈ V Γ0 (A),
I 0 (∀x)φ(x) → φ(b)
and for b ∈ V1(A)
I 1 (∀x)φ(x) → φ(b)
So suppose that e 0 (∀x)φ(x) and b ∈ V
Γ
0 (A). Then in particular,
e 0 φ(b)
If e 1 (∀x)φ(x), then
e 1 φ(b)
So we have shown
I 0 (∀x)φ(x) → φ(b)
However, we can similarly show that for b ∈ V1(A)
I 1 (∀x)φ(x) → φ(b)
So we can deduce
I 0 (∀y)((∀x)φ(x) → φ(y))
as required.
3.3.2 Inference Rules
The inference rules of IPL are
1. φ,φ→ψ
ψ
2. ψ→φ(x)
ψ→(∀x)φ(x) where x /∈ FV (ψ)
3. φ(x)→ψ(∃x)φ(x)→ψ where x /∈ FV (ψ)
1 (Modus Ponens) Note first that we can assume that
e 0 (∀x1, . . . , xn)φ(x1, . . . , xn)
f 0 (∀x1, . . . , xn) φ(x1, . . . , xn)→ ψ(x1, . . . , xn)
where the free variables for φ and ψ are amongst x1, . . . , xn.
Then for any a1, . . . , an ∈ V
Γ
0 (A),
e 0 φ(a1, . . . , an)
f 0 φ(a1, . . . , an)→ ψ(a1, . . . , an)
and hence ef 0 ψ(a1, . . . , an). Similarly, for any a1, . . . , an ∈ V1(A), ef 1
ψ(a1, . . . , an). So we have shown
ef 0 (∀x1, . . . , xn)ψ(x1, . . . , xn)
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2 We show that if e 0 ψ → φ(x), then
e 0 ψ → (∀x)φ(x)
So suppose that e 0 ψ → φ(x). Then, more explicitly (ignoring any additional
free variables) this is
e 0 (∀x) (ψ → φ(x))
In particular, if a ∈ V Γ0 (A), then
e 0 ψ → φ(a)
and if a ∈ V (A) then
e 1 ψ → φ(a)
Now suppose that f 0 ψ. We need to show that for any a ∈ V
Γ
0 (A), ef 0 φ(a)
and for any a ∈ V1(A), ef 1 φ(a). But this is clear from the above, so we can
deduce
ef 0 (∀x)φ(x)
We can similarly show that if f 1 ψ, then
ef 1 (∀x)φ(x)
and so
e 0 ψ → (∀x)φ(x)
3 We claim that if e 0 φ(x) → ψ, then e 0 (∃x)φ(x) → ψ. First note as
before, that what we actually assume is that
e 0 (∀x) (φ(x) → ψ)
Now suppose that f 0 (∃x)φ(x). Then there is a ∈ V
Γ
0 (A) such that f 0 φ(a).
But we know from the above that
e 0 φ(a)→ ψ
And so,
ef 0 ψ
We similarly know that if f 1 (∃x)φ(x), then ef 1 ψ. So we can deduce
e 0 (∃x)φ(x) → ψ
3.3.3 Axioms of Equality
Proposition 3.11. One can construct realizers ir, is, it, i0, i1 such that
1. ir 0 (∀x)x = x
2. is 0 (∀x, y) x = y → y = x
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3. it 0 (∀x, y, z) (x = y → (y = z → x = z))
4. i0 0 (∀x, y, z) (x = y → (y ∈ z → x ∈ z))
5. i1 0 (∀x, y, z) (x = y → (z ∈ x→ z ∈ y))
Furthermore, for each formula (without parameters), φ(x, z1, . . . , zn), there
is iφ such that
iφ 0 x = y → (φ(x, z1, . . . , zn)→ φ(y, z1, . . . , zn))
Proof. We take these realizers from the proof of theorem 6.3 in [16] and check
that they still work in this context.
Define ir from the fixed point theorem so that
((ir)0f)0 = f
((ir)0f)1 = ir
((ir)1f)0 = f
((ir)1f)1 = ir
In order to show ir 0 (∀x)x = x, by proposition 3.9, what we need to show
is
1. for every a ∈ V Γ0 (A), ir 0 a = a
2. for every a ∈ V1(A), ir 1 a = a
However note that the second of these conditions is basically the same as the
statement ir  a = a in V (A). Hence we only have to check the first condition.
Furthermore, since we already know that for every a ∈ V Γ0 (A), ir 1 a = a,
all we have to check is the following:
∀〈0, f, b〉 ∈ a (ir)0 0 b ∈ a
and
∀〈0, f, b〉 ∈ a (ir)1 0 b ∈ a
We show by induction that these conditions hold for every a ∈ V Γ0 (A).
Suppose that 〈0, f, b〉 ∈ a. Then since this has been labelled with 0, we know
that b is also partly symmetric. Also b appears earlier in the inductive definition
of V1(A), so we can apply induction here and the above arguments to get
ir 0 b = b
However, recall that we defined ir using the fixed point theorem so that for
all f ,
((ir)0f)0 = f
((ir)0f)1 = ir
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(and the same equations for (ir)1).
Hence ir 0 a = a as required.
The proof that is works as required is trivial and still holds here.
it, i0 and i1 are also the same as in [16] and the proofs that they are as
required can be similarly adapted to this context.
The iφ are constructed by induction on the construction of φ. We will ex-
plicitly show how to do this for unbounded universal quantifiers and implication
since these contain the main ideas for the rest of the induction.
We first show how to construct iφ→ψ.
Suppose that a, b, c ∈ V Γ0 (A), e 0 a = b and f 0 φ(a, c) → ψ(a, c).
Suppose further that
g 0 φ(b, c)
Then
iφ(ise)g 0 φ(a, c)
and so
f(iφ(ise)g) 0 ψ(a, c)
and finally
iψe(f(iφ(ise)g)) 0 ψ(b, c)
Hence we can apply similar reasoning for 1 and for a, b, c ∈ V1(A) and use
proposition 3.9 to show that we can take iφ→ψ to be
iφ→ψ := λ(x, y, z).iψx(y(iφ(isx)z))
For unbounded universal quantifiers, we show that we can take i(∀z)φ(x,z) :=
iφ(x,z). Suppose that
iφ(x,z) 0 (∀z) (x = y → (φ(x, z)→ φ(y, z)))
and suppose that for a, b ∈ V Γ0 (A), e 0 a = b and
f 0 (∀z)φ(a, z)
Then for all c ∈ V Γ0 (A),
f 0 φ(a, c)
and so
iφ(x,z)ef 0 φ(b, c)
One can check the corresponding case for c ∈ V1(A) to get
iφ(x,z)ef 0 (∀z)φ(b, z)
as required.
Proposition 3.12. We can find realizers for the axioms for bounded quantifiers.
That is, we can find realizers for the following statements.
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1. (∀x ∈ a)φ(x) → (∀x) (x ∈ a→ φ(x))
2. (∀x) (x ∈ a→ φ(x)) → (∀x ∈ a)φ(x)
3. (∃x ∈ a)φ → (∃x) (x ∈ a ∧ φ(x))
4. (∃x) (x ∈ a ∧ φ(x)) → (∃x ∈ a)φ(x)
Proof. The proof of theorem 4.3 from [22] can easily be adapted using proposi-
tion 3.11 and applying proposition 3.9 where necessary.
The following help illustrate the relation between realizability in V Γ0 (A) and
V (A).
Definition 3.13. We say that a ∈ V Γ0 (A) is (completely) symmetric if every
element of a is of the form
〈0, e, b〉
where b is completely symmetric. (This is an inductive definition).
Proposition 3.14. Suppose that φ is a bounded formula, all of whose parame-
ters are completely symmetric. Then
e 0 φ iff e 1 φ
Proof. When all parameters are completely symmetric the two definitions of
realizability agree for everything except unbounded quantifiers.
We now move on to the proof of soundness for the axioms of set theory. To
make things easier, we assume a background universe of ZFC, and show the
soundness of IZF.
Theorem 3.15. V Γ0 (A) satisfies the axioms of IZF.
We first deal with what are sometimes referred to as “set existence axioms.”
That is, axioms of the form
(∀z1, . . . , zn)(∀x)(∃y)φ(x, y, z1, . . . , zn)
where the free variables of φ are amongst x, y, z1, . . . , zn. For these axioms we
can apply proposition 3.9 to show that it is sufficient to find e such that for
every a, c1, . . . , cn ∈ V1(A), there is b ∈ V1(A) such that
e 1 φ(a, b, c1, . . . , cn)
and for every a, c1, . . . , cn ∈ V
Γ
0 (A) there is b ∈ V
Γ
0 (A) such that
e 0 φ(a, b, c1, . . . , cn)
However, the first of these statements follows from the soundness theorem
for V (A). Hence we only have to check the second of these conditions.
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Separation By the above reasoning, what we need to show is the following
statement:
Suppose that e is the usual realizer for separation from [16] or [22], A is a
partly symmetric set, and φ(x) is a formula with partly symmetric parameters.
Then there is a partly symmetric set, S, such that
e 0 ((∀x ∈ A) φ(x)→ x ∈ S) ∧ ((∀x ∈ S) x ∈ A ∧ φ(x))
We construct this S as follows:
S0 = {〈0,pfg, a〉 | 〈0, f, a〉 ∈ A ∧ g 0 φ(a)}
S1 = {〈1,pfg, a〉 | 〈s, f, a〉 ∈ A ∧ g 1 φ(a)}
S = S0 ∪ S1
Suppose that H is the intersection of stabilisers of A and all the parameters
of φ. Note that H ∈ Γ.
Let α ∈ H , and 〈0,pfg, a〉 ∈ S0. Then 〈0, f, a〉 ∈ A and g 0 φ(a). Since
α ∈ H , we know that 〈0, α(f), α(a)〉 ∈ A and α(g) 0 φ(α(a)). Hence we also
have 〈0, α(pfg), α(a)〉 ∈ S0. One can show the same result for S1 and hence get
StabG(S) ∈ Γ. Note further that if 〈0,pfg, a〉 ∈ S then also 〈0, f, a〉 ∈ A and
so a is partly symmetric. We can now deduce that S is partly symmetric.
One can easily check that the usual realizer does still work for S.
Power Set As before, note that we only have to check power set for partly
symmetric sets. Hence let A ∈ V Γ0 (A).
Let
P0 = {〈0, e, b〉 | b ∈ V
Γ
0 (A), e 0 b ⊆ A}
P1 = {〈1, e, b〉 | b ∈ V1(A), e 1 b ⊆ A}
P = P0 ∪ P1
To show that P0 and P1 are both sets, one can use a notion of rank as in
chapter 2 of [16].
Alternatively, we can prove that P0 and P1 are sets as follows. Show by
induction (and power set in the background universe) that for any a ∈ V1(A),
{b ∈ V1(A) | (∃e ∈ A) e 1 b = a} is a set and deduce that for a ∈ V
Γ
0 (A),
{b ∈ V Γ0 (A) | (∃e ∈ A) e 0 b = a} is also a set. Then this implies that for
any a ∈ V1(A), {b ∈ V1(A) | (∃e ∈ A) e 1 b ⊆ a} is a set and if a ∈ V
Γ
0 (A),
{b ∈ V Γ0 (A) | (∃e ∈ A) e 0 b ⊆ a} is a set, and hence P0, P1 and P are also
sets.
Now note that if e 0 b ⊆ A and α ∈ StabG(A) then α(e) 0 α(b) ⊆ A, and
similarly if e 1 b ⊆ A, and we have ensured that any elements of P labelled
with 0 are partly symmetric. Hence P is partly symmetric.
One can easily show that the realizer in [16] still works here.
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Union We assume that we are given a set A ∈ V Γ0 (A) and construct a set to
show the union axiom. Since we already have full separation, we only have to
construct a U such that we have a realizer for (∀x ∈ A)(∀y ∈ x) y ∈ U .
Let
U = {〈0, 0, b〉 | 〈0, e, c〉 ∈ A, 〈0, f, b〉 ∈ c} ∪ {〈1, 0, b〉 | 〈s, e, c〉 ∈ A, 〈s′, f, b〉 ∈ c}
Note that
(k(k(p0ir))) 0 (∀x ∈ A)(∀y ∈ x) y ∈ U
Pair Given a, b ∈ V Γ0 (A), consider the set
P = {〈0, 0, a〉, 〈0, 1, b〉}
We can easily see that
e 0 (∀x)(x ∈ P ↔ (x = a ∨ x = b))
Infinity We check that the proof in [22] still holds here. We use the same ω¯
as in section 1.5. We write ⊥v for the formula (∀x ∈ v) ⊥, and write SC(x, y)
for y = x ∪ {x} (expressed as a bounded formula).
Note first that we can apply proposition 3.14 and the soundness theorem in
[22] to reduce the problem to finding a realizer for
(∀v)((⊥v ∨ (∃u ∈ ω¯)SC(u, v))→ v ∈ ω¯)
Since we can clearly find a realizer to show that the empty set is in ω¯, this
is reduced to finding a realizer for
(∀v)((∃u ∈ ω¯)SC(u, v) → v ∈ ω¯)
Hence we assume that there is a ∈ V Γ0 (A) with e 0 (∃u ∈ ω¯) SC(u, a). So
there must be some n such that (e)0 = n and (e)1 0 SC(n, a).
One can clearly find a realizer for SC(n, n+ 1) and hence a realizer, us-
ing the soundness of extensionality (once we have checked this) for SC(u, v) ∧
SC(u, v′) → v = v′. We can use these to construct a realizer for a ∈ ω, as
required.
Collection Assume
e 0 (∀x ∈ A)(∃y)φ(x, y)
where φ is a formula with all parameters partly symmetric.
By collection in the background universe, we can find a C0 such that when-
ever 〈0, f, a〉 ∈ A, there is 〈0, 0, c〉 ∈ C0 such that c is partly symmetric and
e.f 0 φ(a, c). Note that C
′
0 := C0 ∩ {0} × {0} × V
Γ
0 (A) still has this prop-
erty, but is an element of V1(A) such that for every 〈0, g, c〉 ∈ C
′
0, c is partly
symmetric.
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Similarly, there is a C′1, such that every element of C
′
1 is of the form 〈1, 0, c〉
with c ∈ V1(A) and whenever 〈s, f, a〉 ∈ A, there is 〈1, 0, c〉 ∈ C
′
1 such that
ef 1 φ(a, c).
Let C = C′0 ∪ C
′
1, and let C
′ be the closure of C under all automorphisms
in G. Note that C′ ∈ V Γ0 (A) and this set together with the usual realizer from
[16] is enough to show the soundness of collection.
Extensionality One can check that the realizers for the formula
((∀x ∈ a)x ∈ b) ∧ ((∀x ∈ b)x ∈ a)
in fact are already realizers for a = b, so we can use the identity to show
extensionality (in this form).
∈-Induction Suppose that
e 0 (∀y)((∀x ∈ y)φ(x) → φ(y))
Let e′ = λ(x, y).ex and let f be given by the fixed point theorem so that for
all g
fg ≃ e′fg
Note that we know
e 1 (∀y)((∀x ∈ y)φ(x) → φ(y))
and so by the usual proof we have that for all a ∈ V1(A), and all g ∈ A,
fg 1 φ(a). We claim that for all a ∈ V
Γ
0 (A), and all g ∈ A, fg ↓ and
fg 0 φ(a).
So suppose that a ∈ V Γ0 (A). Then for every 〈0, g, b〉 ∈ a, we know by
induction in the background universe (since b must be partly symmetric and
appears earlier in the inductive definition of V1(A) than a) that fg ↓ and fg 0
φ(b). We also know from the above that f 1 (∀x ∈ a)φ(x). Hence f 0 (∀x ∈
a)φ(x). Thus we have for any g ∈ A, e′fg ≃ ef (is defined and) realizes φ(a).
But e′fg ≃ fg and so fg 0 φ(a) as required.
Remark 3.16. Note that when we proved the axiom of infinity we used the
same standard representation ω as for V (A). Note further that if f ∈ A is such
that for all n ∈ ω there is m ∈ ω with fn = m, then the f from section 1.5 is
completely symmetric and hence we have the same standard representations of
the naturals and Baire space as we did before.
4 The Model V f0 (A)
We say that a ∈ V (A) is functional if for any 〈e, b〉, 〈e′, b′〉 ∈ a, if e = e′ then
b = b′.
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We will define V f0 (A) using inductive definitions. Define the operator P
f
A by
P fA(X) := {a ∈ P(|A| ×X) | a is functional}
We then define V f0 (A) as the smallest class X satisfying
P fA(X) ⊆ X
We define realizability on V f0 (A) as follows. We write 1 for realizability at
V (A).
e 0 a ∈ b iff there is 〈(e)0, c〉 ∈ b such that (e)1 0 a = c
e 0 a = b iff for every 〈f, c〉 ∈ a, (e)0f 0 c ∈ b and
for every 〈f, c〉 ∈ b, (e)1f 0 c ∈ a
e 0 φ ∧ ψ iff (e)0 0 φ and (e)1 0 ψ
e 0 φ ∨ ψ iff either (e)0 = 0 and (e)1 0 φ, or (e)0 = 1 and (e)1 0 ψ
e 0 φ→ ψ iff f 0 φ implies ef 0 ψ and e 1 φ→ ψ
e 0 (∃x ∈ a)φ(x) iff there is 〈(e)0, b〉 ∈ a such that (e)1 0 φ(b)
e 0 (∀x ∈ a)φ(x) iff for every 〈f, b〉 ∈ a, ef 0 φ(b), and e 1 (∀x ∈ a)φ(x)
e 0 (∃x)φ(x) iff there is a ∈ V
f
0 (A) such that e 0 φ(a)
e 0 (∀x)φ(x) iff for every a ∈ V
f
0 (A), e 0 φ(a), and e 1 (∀x)φ(x)
e 0 ¬φ iff f 1 φ is false for every f ∈ A
We write V f0 (A) |= φ to mean that there is some e ∈ A such that e 0 φ.
Remark 4.1. This is a much simpler embedding than that of V Γ0 (A). We have
not needed to alter the definition of realizability for bounded universal quantifica-
tion and equality in order to ensure realizability is preserved. Hence, realizability
for bounded formulae is identical in V f0 (A) and V (A).
Proposition 4.2. V f0 (A) is sound with respect to the intuitionistic predicate
calculus and satisfies the axioms of equality and the axioms for bounded quanti-
fiers.
Proof. This follows by exactly the same proof as for V Γ0 (A).
It remains to check that when we show the soundness of the axioms of CZF,
we can assume the sets we construct are functional. Since we will require choice
in the background universe for this proof, we work over a background universe
of ZFC.
Theorem 4.3. V f0 (A) is sound with respect to the axioms of CZF.
Extensionality This is the same as for V (A).
23
Bounded Separation Given A ∈ V f0 (A) and a bounded formula, φ, consider
the set
S = {〈pef, a〉 | 〈e, a〉 ∈ A, f 0 φ(a)}
Note that this is functional, since A is, and since realizability for bounded
formulae is identical in V f0 (A) and V (A), we can see that this can be used to
show the soundness of bounded separation.
Pair Given a, b ∈ V (A), consider
P = {〈0, a〉, 〈1, b〉}
This is clearly functional, and we can easily use this to show the soundness of
pair.
Strong Collection Suppose that
e 0 (∀x ∈ A)(∃y)φ(x, y)
For each 〈f, a〉 ∈ A, we can assume by choice in the background universe that
we have chosen a cf ∈ V
f
0 (A) such that ef 0 φ(a, cf ) (and hence also ef 1
φ(a, cf )).
Let
C = {〈f, cf 〉 | 〈f, a〉 ∈ A}
This is clearly functional (since A is).
Note that
λx.px(ex) 0 (∀x ∈ A)(∃y ∈ C)φ(x, y)
and in fact we can use exactly the same realizer again in
λx.px(ex) 0 (∀y ∈ C)(∃x ∈ A)φ(x, y)
(since every element of C is of the form 〈f, cf 〉 where 〈f, x〉 ∈ A and e.f 0
φ(x, cf )). So we get soundness for strong collection.
Subset Collection Suppose we are given sets A,B ∈ V f0 (A). Suppose further
that e ∈ A is such that for all 〈f, a〉 ∈ A, ef ↓ and there is 〈ef, b〉 ∈ B for some
b. In this case we can define
e := {〈f, b〉 | ∃a〈f, a〉 ∈ A, 〈ef, b〉 ∈ B}
(Clearly e ∈ V f0 (A)).
Now let
D := {〈e, e〉 | e ∈ A, e is defined}
Clearly D ∈ V f0 (A). We shall show that we can use D to show the soundness
of subset collection.
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Suppose that u ∈ V (A) is such that
e 1 (∀x ∈ A)(∃y ∈ B)φ(x, y, u)
Let
e′ := λx.(ex)0
Note that for every 〈f, a〉 ∈ A, we have e′f ↓ and there is (a unique) b with
〈e′f, b〉 ∈ B, and so 〈e′, e′〉 ∈ D. Furthermore (ef)1 1 φ(a, b, u), and so we can
find a realizer for
(∀x ∈ A)(∃y ∈ e′)φ(x, y, u) ∧ (∀y ∈ e′)(∃x ∈ A)φ(x, y, u)
We can do exactly same if
e 0 (∀x ∈ A)(∃y ∈ B)φ(x, y, u)
Hence this does give a proof of the soundness of subset collection.
Union Suppose we have been given A ∈ V f0 (A). We want to find an functional
set that we can use to show the union axiom. So let
U = {〈pef, c〉 | 〈f, b〉 ∈ a, 〈e, c〉 ∈ b}
Then we see that
λ(x, y).(p(pyx)ir) 0 (∀x ∈ a)(∀y ∈ x) y ∈ U
Infinity We note that the ω given in section 1.5 is functional, and since no
other sets need to be constructed in the proof of infinity, this means we can use
the same proof as usual here (see eg [22]).
∈-Induction The same proof as for V Γ0 (A) still holds here.
5 The Pca T
5.1 Definition
We will define a term model based on combinatory logic. This is similar to the
model NT that appears in chapter 6 of [3].
We start by adding constants ξi and ζF to the language of combinatory logic.
Definition 5.1. The set, C of terms is defined inductively as follows
1. constants s and k are terms
2. free variables xi for each i ∈ ω are terms
3. for each i > 0, the constant ξi is a term (we will call these atoms)
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4. for each bijection F : ω>0 → ω>0 such that F is the identity everywhere
except for some finite set, the constant ζF is a term
5. if s and t are terms, then the ordered pair 〈s, t〉, written as (s.t) or just st
is also a term
Remark 5.2. Instead of using those F that are the identity everywhere except
for a finite set, the proofs in this paper will still hold using any subgroup of
permutations of ω>0 that contains all transpositions. For example, we could
alternatively let F be any permutation of ω>0 or consider just the computable
permutations.
We will consider C as a term rewriting system. We have in particular the
two standard reduction rules
sxyz → xz(yz)
kxy → x
In addition to these, we add a new reduction rule. In the below let n be n
encoded using s and k in the usual way. Then we define the ζ-rule, or ζ-reduction
as follows:
ζF t→ n
where t is a closed term and n is either maximal such that n = F (m) where ξm
occurs in t or n = 0 and no ξm occurs in t.
Note that this term rewriting system is ambiguous. That is, there are
terms that can be reduced in two incompatible ways. For example, the term
ζλx.x(kkξ1) can reduce either to 1 or to 0 depending on whether the subterm
kkξ1 is reduced before or after ζ-reduction. However, we still have a notion of
normal form (when no reduction rule can be applied to a term) and leftmost
innermost reduction, as defined below.
Definition 5.3. We define a sequence of partial operators, REDn for each n as
follows:
For n = 0, define RED0 as follows:
1. if t is a normal form, RED0(t) = t
2. for t = krs where r and s are normal forms, RED0(krs) = r
3. for t = ζF r where r is a normal form, RED0(ζF r) = n where n is maximal
such that ξF−1(n) occurs in r or 0 if no ξi occurs in r
If REDn has been already been defined, then we define REDn+1 as follows:
1. if REDn(t) ↓, then REDn+1(t) = REDn(t)
2. for t = srsu, where r, s, and u are normal forms, REDn+1(srsu) ≃
REDn(REDn(ru)REDn(su))
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3. if t = rs and neither of previous cases apply, then REDn+1(rs) ≃ REDn(REDn(r)REDn(s))
We then define RED as
RED =
⋃
n∈ω
REDn
Note that if RED(t) is defined, then it is a normal form.
We now define our pca, T
Definition 5.4. Let T be the set of closed normal forms of C together with the
following application:
s.t := RED(s.t)
(undefined if RED(s.t) is undefined)
Note that since this is a pca we can consider the notion of terms over T (ie
definition 1.12) as well as terms in the sense of definition 5.1. Fortunately we
are free to switch between thinking of terms as elements of C and as terms over
T by the following proposition. (Note that this proposition is a characteristic of
inside first reduction and is not shared by some similar structures: see Remark
6.1.4 in [3].)
Proposition 5.5. Suppose that t is a closed term over T (in the sense of defi-
nition 1.12) and write t∗ for the corresponding term (in the sense of definition
5.1). Then RED(t∗) is defined if and only if t denotes, and in this case we have
RED(t∗) = t
Proof. This essentially appears as parts (i) and (ii) of lemma 6.1.1 in chapter 6
of [3]. We simply note that the proof still holds in this setting where we also
have ζ-reduction.
Proposition 5.6. T is a pca.
Proof. Note firstly that s and k are normal terms and hence elements of T .
If r and s are normal forms, then so are kr and srs. Hence kr ↓, sr ↓, and
srs ↓. Also RED(krs) = r, so krs = r.
It remains only to check that for all r, s, t, srst ≃ rt(st). However this is
clear from the definition. (In fact the left hand side is defined at stage n+ 1 if
and only if the right hand side is defined at stage n.)
5.2 Preservation of Atoms
The non trivial structure of V Γ0 (T ) will rely on the ξi, and the rich supply of
automorphisms arising from permutations of them. We will want to ensure
therefore that under suitable conditions the atoms aren’t eliminated by the
realizability structure. In this section, we will aim towards a lemma that will
enable us to show this.
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Definition 5.7. For any pca, A, one may consider the following classes of
elements
1. f ∈ A is type 1 if for every n ∈ ω, fn ↓, and there is some m ∈ ω such
that fn = m
2. e ∈ A is type 2 if for every type 1 f , ef ↓ and ef is type 1
3. e ∈ A is a type 2 identity if it is type 2 and for all f type 1 and for all
n ∈ ω, efn = fn
We will now show that being able to decide whether a term is defined or not
is equivalent to the halting problem.
Proposition 5.8. Suppose that t(x) = t1(x)t2(x), l ∈ ω, and r is a normal
form. If REDl((λx.t(x))r) ↓, then l > 0 and REDl−1(t(r)) ↓.
Proof. Note that from the definition of lambda terms over a pca (see [3] or [27])
we know that
λx.t(x) := s(λx.t1(x))(λx.t2(x))
Note firstly that (λx.t(x))r = s(λx.t1(x))(λx.t2(x))r and hence we can only
have REDl((λx.t(x))r) ↓ for l > 0. Furthermore,
REDl(s(λx.t1(x))(λx.t2(x))r) ≃ REDl−1(REDl−1((λx.t1(x))r)REDl−1((λx.t2(x))r))
Since we are assuming that REDl((λx.t(x))r) ↓, we know in particular that
REDl−1((λx.t1(x))r) ↓ and REDl−1((λx.t2(x))r) ↓, and hence
REDl−1(REDl−1((λx.t1(x))r)REDl−1((λx.t2(x))r)) = REDl−1(t1(r)t2(r))
= REDl−1(t(r))
and in particular REDl−1(t(r)) ↓.
Proposition 5.9. For any m,n ∈ ω, there is a closed normal form tm and a
normal form t′n,m(x) with free variable x such that for all r ∈ T
1. RED(tmr) ↓ if and only if the mth Turing machine halts on input m, and
if this occurs RED(tmr) = I (I := skk)
2. RED(t′n,m(ζF )r) ↓ if and only if the mth Turing machine halts on input
m, and if this occurs RED(tm(ζF )r) = F (n)
3. tm contains no ξi and t
′
n,m contains ξi for i = n only
Proof. By representability of computable functions in pcas (see eg [27] or [3]),
one can construct um such that for every k ∈ ω,
umk =
{
kI if the mth Turing machine halts by stage k on input m
(λz.zk + 1) if the mth Turing machine does not halt by stage k on input m
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Then, following the construction in the fixed point theorem, define
w := λx.(λy.umy(xx))
v := ww
= λy.umy(ww)
Then if the mth Turing machine halts at stage k on input m,
v0 ≃ um0(ww)
≃ um0v
≃ v1
...
≃ vk
≃ umk(ww)
≃ (kI)(ww)
≃ I
In particular v0 ↓.
Now suppose that the mth Turing machine never halts on inputm. We show
by induction on l that for all l ∈ ω and for all k ∈ ω,
REDl(vk) ↑
Assume that for all k ∈ ω and for all l′ < l the statement REDl′(vk) ↑ holds
and assume for a contradiction that REDl(vk) ↓. Note that
REDl(vk) = REDl(((λy.umy)(ww))k)
and so by proposition 5.8, we know in particular that REDl−1(umk(ww)) ↓.
But in this case
REDl−1(umk(ww)) = REDl−2(REDl−2(umk)REDl−2(ww))
= REDl−2((λz.zk + 1)v)
= REDl−3(vk + 1)
and so in particular REDl−3(vk + 1) ↓ giving a contradiction as required.
Finally, let tm = s(kv)(k0). Then, for all r, tmr ≃ v0, by the basic properties
of s and k.
For parts 2 and 3, let tm be as above and let t
′
n,m(x) = s(stm(kx))(kξn).
Note that part 2 follows from the basic properties of s and k and that part 3 is
clear from the definitions of tm and t
′
n,m(x).
Lemma 5.10 (Preservation of Atoms). Let e be a type 2 identity in T . Then
for any n, there is some type 1 f in T such that RED(e.f) contains the atom
ξn as a subterm and furthermore, f only contains ξi such that i = n.
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Proof. Assume that the lemma does not hold. Then there is some n such that
whenever f is type 1 and contains ξi only for i = n, we have that RED(e.f)
does not contain ξn. (That is, e “strips away the ξn”). We will use this to derive
a contradiction and conclude that the lemma holds.
We will define a (computable) family fm(x) of normal forms with one free
variable such that for each F , fm(ζF ) is type 1 in T .
Let gm ∈ T be such that for all l ∈ ω, gml = k(k0) if the mth Turing
machine with input m has not halted by stage l and gml = I if the mth Turing
machine has halted by stage l. We can do this using the representability of
primitive recursive functions in pcas.
Then let t′n,m(x) be as in proposition 5.9. Define
fm(x) := s(sgm(kt
′
n,m(x)))I
Note that this is in normal form and that we may assume it contains ξi only for
i = n. If the mth Turing machine has not halted by stage l then for any ζF
RED(fm(ζF )l) ≃ RED(RED((sgm(kt
′
n,m(ζF )))l)l)
≃ RED(RED(RED(gml)t
′
n,m(ζF ))l)
≃ RED(RED(k(k0)t′n,m(ζF ))l)
≃ RED(k0l)
≃ 0
In particular, see that fm(ζF )l ↓ even if the mth Turing machine never halts on
input m. If the mth Turing machine on input m has halted by stage l, then
RED(fm(ζF )l) ≃ RED(RED((sgm(kt
′
n,m(ζF )))l)l)
≃ RED(RED(RED(gml)t
′
n,m(ζF ))l)
≃ RED(RED(It′n,m(ζF ))l)
≃ RED(t′n,m(ζF )l)
≃ F (n)
Hence for any m ∈ ω and any ζF , fm(ζF ) is type 1 in the sense we defined
earlier.
We therefore know that e.fm(ζF ) ≃ RED(e.fm(ζF )) ↓ and by hypothesis
RED(e.fm(ζF )) cannot contain ξn. For convenience, in the below we will assume
that F is chosen such that ζF does not occur anywhere in e.
Note that we can carry out an algorithm to find RED(e.fm(ζF )) from m.
(Since each F is the identity everywhere except for some finite set, we can easily
construct a suitable Go¨del numbering for T ).
Furthermore, note that when we carry out this algorithm we can check
whether or not we ever need to evaluate RED(t′n,m(ζF )r) for some r. If we
did need to evaluate this, then in particular RED(t′n,m(ζF )r) ↓ and so the mth
Turing machine must halt on input m. On the other hand, if we did not need to
evaluate RED(t′n,m(ζF )r), then ζF was never used in the ζ-rule because it only
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ever occurs as a subterm of the normal form t′n,m(ζF ). Furthermore, by hypoth-
esis t′n,m(ζF ) cannot occur as a subterm of RED(e.fm(ζF )), because otherwise
e.fm(ζF ) would contain ξn.
Hence if we choose F ′ such that F ′(n) 6= F (n) then
RED(e.fm(ζF )) = RED(e.fm(ζF ′))
But note that this means fm(ζF ) and fm(ζF ′ ) must have the same value on l for
every l ∈ ω. This can only happen if they are both identically zero and hence
the mth Turing machine does not halt on input m.
Therefore we could use such an algorithm to solve the halting problem and
we derive our contradiction.
5.3 Automorphisms of T
Suppose that π : ω>0 → ω>0 is a permutation that is the identity everywhere
except on some finite set. Then π induces an automorphism α : T → T as
follows.
1. α(ξn) = ξpi(n)
2. α(ζF ) = ζF◦pi−1
3. α(s) = s
4. α(k) = k
5. α(s.t) = α(s).α(t)
Note that we have chosen the action of α on the ζF so that it is compat-
ible with the ζ-rule and the action of α on the ξn. α is clearly therefore an
automorphism of T .
Note also that these automorphisms form a subgroup of the group of auto-
morphisms of T .
6 A Useful Lemma
Before we move onto the proof itself, we prove a lemma that is true in general
for any pca A. Informally, what this says is the property of being functional
can be inherited “up to realizability” across sets that are realizably equal.
Lemma 6.1. If a, b ∈ V (A) with a functional and V (A) |= a = b, then there is
e ∈ A such that whenever 〈f, c〉 and 〈f, c′〉 are both elements of b,
ef  c = c′
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Proof. Suppose that V (A) |= a = b and a is functional. Then there is some
e′ ∈ A such that
e′  a = b
Given 〈f, c〉 and 〈f, c′〉 in b, we know from the definition of realizability for
equality that there must be 〈((e′)1f)0, d〉, 〈((e
′)1f)0, d
′〉 ∈ a such that
((e′)1f)1  c = d
((e′)1f)1  c
′ = d′
Since a is functional, we know in fact that d = d′ and so
it((e
′)1f)1(is((e
′)1f)1)  c = c
′
Hence we can take
e := λx.it((e
′)1x)1(is((e
′)1x)1)
7 Failure of the Existence Property
We will show that the existence property fails for CZF in the following instance.
Theorem 7.1. There is no formula with one free variable χ(x) such that
CZF ⊢ (∃!x)χ(x)
and
CZF ⊢ χ(x) → x ⊆ mv(NN,N) ∧ (∀R ∈ mv(NN,N))(∃S ∈ x)S ⊆ R
This will immediately give the following corollary.
Corollary 7.2. CZF does not have wEP.
Proof. We know that
CZF ⊢ (∃x)(x ⊆ mv(NN,N) ∧ (∀R ∈ mv(NN,N))(∃S ∈ x)S ⊆ R)
Suppose that there is some ψ(x) such that
CZF ⊢ (∃!x)ψ(x)
CZF ⊢ (∀x) ψ(x) → (∃z) z ∈ x
CZF ⊢ (∀x) ψ(x) → (∀z ∈ x)
(z ⊆ mv(NN,N) ∧ (∀R ∈ mv(NN,N))(∃S ∈ z)S ⊆ R)
Then by taking χ(w) to be (∀x) (ψ(x) → w =
⋃
x), we would get
CZF ⊢ (∃!w)χ(w)
and
CZF ⊢ χ(w) → w ⊆ mv(NN,N) ∧ (∀R ∈ mv(NN,N))(∃S ∈ w)S ⊆ R
contradicting the theorem.
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Proof of theorem 7.1 Assume that there is such a χ(x).
Let T be the pca from section 5 and let G be the group of all automorphisms
obtained from permutations of ω that are the identity except on some finite set,
as in section 5.3. Let Γ be the normal filter generated by {StabG(ξn) | n ∈ ω}.
Note that StabG(x) ∈ Γ exactly when there is some finite set F ⊆ {ξi | i ∈ ω}
such that whenever an automorphism α fixes every ξi ∈ F , α also fixes x. This
is sometimes referred to as x being of finite support relative to {ξi | i ∈ ω}.
By the soundness theorems, there must be Cf ∈ V f0 (T ) and C
Γ ∈ V Γ0 (T )
such that
V f0 (T ) |= χ(C
f)
V Γ0 (T ) |= χ(C
Γ)
Hence we must have that
V (T ) |= χ(Cf) ∧ χ((CΓ)◦)
and so
V (T ) |= Cf = (CΓ)◦
This allows to apply lemma 6.1 and deduce that there is some e0 such that
for any 〈f, c〉, 〈f, c′〉 ∈ (CΓ)◦,
e0.f  c = c
′
In fact this is the only point where we need Cf and we can now derive a
contradiction by examining CΓ carefully.
Let N and NN be as defined in section 1.5. Recall that the elements of NN
are of the form 〈f, f〉 as described in section 1.5.
Write ζ1 for ζλx.x and for each N , construct RN ∈ V
Γ
0 (T ),
RN := {〈0, f, (f, n)〉 | f is type 1, n ≤ N,n = ζ1f} ∪
{〈0, f, (f, n)〉 | f is type 1, n > N, ζ1f = m for some m > N}
(where we write (, ) for V Γ0 (T )’s internal notion of ordered pairs)
Lemma 7.3. We have constructed these RN so that the following hold:
1. RN ∈ V
Γ
0 (T ). In fact
⋂N
i=1 StabG(ξi) ⊆ StabG(RN ).
2. There is some e1 ∈ T such that for all N , e1 
Γ
0 RN ∈ mv(N
N,N).
3. Suppose that 〈0, f, a〉 ∈ RN and ξi occurs in f only if i ≤ N . Then
a = (f, n) where n = ζ1f (and n ≤ N).
Proof. For 1, note that each set in the binary union in the definition of RN is
preserved by elements of
⋂N
i=1 StabG(ξi).
For 2, note that each RN can be “represented” by ζ1. This can clearly be
used to produce a realizer that these are multi valued functions.
Part 3 is clear from the definition.
33
We will aim for our contradiction by first showing a lemma stating that any
automorphism satisfying certain properties has to be the identity. This will use
the key lemma from section 5.2 as well as the basic properties of RN . We will
then construct a non trivial automorphism satisfying these conditions. In this
lemma we work over V (T ) rather than V Γ0 (A).
We first prove some basic properties of V (T ) that will be used in the lemma.
Proposition 7.4. 1. for all n,m ∈ ω, V (T ) |= n = m implies that n = m
2. for all a, b ∈ V (T ), V (T ) |= (a, b) = (a′, b′) if and only if V (T ) |= a = a′
and V (T ) |= b = b′
3. if g and h are type 1 and V (T ) |= g = h, then for all n ∈ ω, gn = hn
Proof. For 1, first show that for any n,m ∈ ω, if V (T ) |= m = n, then m ≥ n.
We do this by induction on n. For n = 0, note that we always have that m ≥ n.
Now suppose that V (T ) |= m = n+ 1. Note that since 〈n, n〉 ∈ n+ 1, we know
there must be some l < m such that V (T ) |= l = n. By induction, we may
assume that l ≥ n, and deduce that m ≥ n+ 1. By noting that V (T ) |= m = n
implies V (T ) |= n = m we deduce the result.
For 2, we can prove in CZF the theorem that (x, y) = (x′, y′) if and only if
x = x′ and y = y′. (See section 3.2 of [2] for details). By applying the soundness
theorem for CZF we deduce that for any a, b, a′, b′ ∈ V (T ), V (T ) |= (a, b) =
(a′, b′)↔ (a = a′ ∧ b = b′). However, this implies the result.
For 3, let g and h be of type 1, and let n ∈ ω. Then there is m ∈ ω
such that gn = m. By the definition of g, we have 〈n, (n,m)〉 ∈ g. By the
definition of realizability for equality and V (T ) |= g = h, this implies that
there is some 〈e, c〉 ∈ h such that V (T ) |= (n,m) = c. By the definition of
h there must be n′,m′ ∈ ω such that e = n′, c = (n′,m′) and hn′ = m′. So
V (T ) |= (n,m) = (n′,m′). Applying the previous two parts, we get that n = n′
and m = m′, and deduce that gn = hn, as required.
Lemma 7.5. Suppose that a ∈ V (T ), N < N ′ ∈ ω, and e, f ∈ T are such that
1. For any ξi occurring in e or f , i ≤ N
2.
⋂N
i=1 StabG(ξi) ⊆ StabG(a)
3. e  (∀x ∈ a)x ∈ R◦N ′
4. f  (∀x ∈ NN)(∃y ∈ a)(∃z ∈ N) y = (x, z)
Then, whenever α ∈ G fixes ξi for i ≤ N and i > N
′, α must also fix ξi for
N < i ≤ N ′ and hence α must be the identity.
Proof. We first check that λx.(e(fx)0)0 ∈ T is a type 2 identity.
Let g be type 1. Then 〈g, g〉 ∈ NN. Therefore there is b such that 〈(fg)0, b〉 ∈
a and (fg)1  (∃z ∈ N) b = (g, z) by expanding out the definition of realizability
for bounded universal and existential quantifiers in assumption 4.
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Let h be the element of T denoted by (e(fg)0)0. (Note that we can show
the term does denote by applying the definition of realizability and assumptions
3 and 4). Then we know that there is some c such that 〈h, c〉 ∈ R◦N ′ and
(e(fg)0)1  b = c, by noting that 〈(fg)0, b〉 ∈ a and applying assumption 3. By
the definition of RN ′ we know that c must be of the form (h,m) for somem ∈ ω.
From above we know that V (T ) |= (∃z ∈ N) b = (g, z) and V (T ) |= b = (h,m),
so we deduce that V (T ) |= g = h by applying part 2 of proposition 7.4. Hence g
and h must have the same graphs as type 1 elements by part 3 of proposition 7.4,
and so since (λx.(e(fx)0)0)g denotes h, λx.(e(fx)0)0 must be a type 2 identity
as required.
Now let α ∈ G fix ξi for i ≤ N and i > N
′. Suppose for a contradiction that
there is some n with N < n < N ′ such that α(ξn) 6= ξn.
By applying lemma 5.10 we can find a type 1 g ∈ T such that g only contains
ξi for i = n and such that ξn does occur in the element of T denoted by (e(fg)0)0
(or equivalently by proposition 5.5 the result of reducing (e(fg)0)0 by leftmost
innermost reduction). Let b, h, and c be as above, but for this particular g.
Since e and f only contain ξi for i ≤ N and g only contains ξn, we know that
h can only contain ξi for i ≤ N or i = n, because applying leftmost innermost
reduction can’t introduce any new ξi that weren’t already in the term (e(fg)0)0.
Since we have guaranteed that h does contain ξn, we know that ζ1h = n. In
particular n ≤ N ′, so we know from part 3 of lemma 7.3 that c must be of the
form (h, n).
Since α fixes ξi for i ≤ N we know from assumption 2 that α also fixes a.
Therefore, since 〈(fg)0, b〉 ∈ a we must also have 〈α((fg)0), α(b)〉 ∈ a. Hence
if h′ is the element of T denoted by (eα((fg)0))0 we know that there is some
c′ with 〈h′, c′〉 ∈ R◦N ′ and V (T ) |= α(b) = c
′ by applying assumption 3 and the
definition of RN ′ as we did before.
Since α fixes ξi for i ≤ N we know that ξi can only occur in e and α(f) for
i ≤ N . Since α fixes ξi for i > N
′, we know that α(ξn) must be some ξi where
i ≤ N ′. Hence h′ only contains ξi for i ≤ N
′. Furthermore neither α(f) nor
α(g) contains ξn and from the assumption that α(ξn) 6= ξn we also know that ξn
does not occur in α(g). Hence ζ1h
′ = m for some m ≤ N ′ with m 6= n. Again
from part 3 of lemma 7.3, we know therefore that c′ is of the form (h′,m). In
particular, since V (T ) |= α(b) = c′, this means that V (T ) |= α(b) = (h′,m).
But then since V (T ) |= b = (h, n), we have that V (T ) |= α(b) = (α(h), α(n))
by proposition 3.2. Together with V (T ) |= α(b) = (h′,m) and applying part
2 of proposition 7.4, this gives V (T ) |= α(n) = m. In fact α(n) = n, since
ω was constructed only using elements of T fixed by all automorphisms. So
V (T ) |= n = m, and applying part 1 of proposition 7.4 we get n = m. But this
is a contradiction since m 6= n.
Since we know V Γ0 (T ) |= (∀x ∈ mv(N
N,N))(∃y ∈ CΓ) (y ⊆ x ∧ y ∈
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mv(NN,N)), there must be f, e2, e3 ∈ T and cn such that for all n,
〈0, f, cn〉 ∈ C
Γ
e2 
Γ
0 (∀x ∈ cn)x ∈ Rn
e3 
Γ
0 (∀x ∈ N
N)(∃y ∈ cn)(∃z ∈ N) y = (x, z)
In particular we know that for all n, StabG(cn) ∈ Γ and hence by proposition
3.6 StabG(c
◦
n) ∈ Γ. From now on we will work entirely over V (T ).
Recall that we chose e0 so that for all m and n,
e0f  c
◦
m = c
◦
n
and so by substitution we can use e0f and e2 to construct e4 such that for all
m and n
e4  (∀x ∈ c
◦
m)x ∈ R
◦
n
Now let N be large enough such that the list ξ1, . . . , ξN includes any ξn in a
support of c◦0, or appearing in e0, e1e2, e3 or e4.
Let N ′ = N + 2.
Note that we have
e4  (∀x ∈ c
◦
0)x ∈ R
◦
N ′
Let α be the automorphism that swaps round ξN+1 and ξN+2, fixing every-
thing else. Then we know that α fixes ξi for i ≤ N (and hence also fixes c
◦
0 and
any ξi occurring in e3 and e4) and fixes ξi for i > N
′. However, clearly α does
not fix ξN+1. Hence we can finally get a contradiction by applying lemma 7.5.
8 Conclusion
8.1 What the failure of EP means
We have shown that CZF does not have EP, or indeed even wEP. Since EP was
described in the introduction as a property to be expected from constructive
formal theories, one might ask if its failure indicates some weakness in CZF as
a constructive theory. The short answer is no: CZF is still a sound foundation
for constructive mathematics.
The main theorem of this paper shows essentially that CZF asserts the ex-
istence of mathematical objects that it does not know how to construct. How-
ever, CZF does have natural interpretations in which these objects can be
constructed. One example is Aczel’s original interpretation of CZF into type
theory in [1]. Here, the sets asserted in the fullness axiom are sets of those
multivalued functions that arise from elements of a particular exponential type.
Another (related) interpretation is Rathjen’s “formulas as classes” in [21], in
which CZF is interpreted into CZFE . In this example the full sets appear as
exponentials in the background universe. In [25] Rathjen and Tupailo showed
using these techniques that CZF with a choice principle ΠΣ−AC has a form
of the existence property.
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8.2 Further Work
In this paper we used the axioms of ZFC in several places, with what appears to
be an essential use of choice in the soundness of strong collection in V f0 (A). This
means that the final result of the paper was only proved on the assumption that
ZFC is consistent. We conjecture that in fact this assumption is unwarranted
and with a more sophisticated construction the result can shown only on the
assumption that CZF is consistent.
Choice principles tend to fail in V Γ0 (A) (in fact one can check that countable
choice fails in V Γ0 (T )), so it remains open whether CZF together with particular
choice principles have EP.
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